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MISTAKES, PRECEDENT, AND THE RISE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: TOWARD A
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE
SECOND BEST
Peter B. McCutchent
INTRODUCTION
A little over forty years ago, Justice Jackson characterized the rise
of the administrative state as "probably the most significant legal trend
of the last century."1 He coined the term "Fourth Branch" to describe
administrative agencies and contended that this fourth branch "has
deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a
fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking."2 Today,
forty years later, our legal theories remain deranged. Current ap-
proaches to separation of powers problems remain inadequate to the
task of coping with the administrative state.
The reason is simple. The structural Constitution3 sets forth a
system of government that allocates power among three depart-
t Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School.
J.D. 1990, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Terri Abruzzo,
Bob Bennett, Michelle Browdy, John Donohue, Deirdre Fox, Melinda Hardy, Kathy Mori-
arty, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful thoughts and comments with respect to prior
drafts of this Article. I am also extremely grateful to Gary Lawson, Tammy McCutchen,
and Paula Stannard, each of whom'took the time to do a detailed markup of a prior draft.
Their comments-both substantive and editorial-went above and beyond the call of duty.
Finally, I would like to thank Becky Adams and Kathi Ortiz for their excellent secretarial
work.
1 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
2 1&
3 Traditionally, commentators have distinguished between structural provisions of
the Constitution-which allocate powers among the various branches of government and
between the federal and state governments-and individual rights provisions-which guar-
antee individual rights. Some have argued that different interpretive methodologies are
appropriate for analyzing these two different types of provisions. See MICHAEL PERRY, THE
CONSTrION, THE COURT, AND HuMAN RIGHTs 37-60 (1982) (defending "noninterpre-
tive" review of "human rights" provisions of the Constitution while rejecting such review
with respect to separation of powers issues). Akhil Amar has criticized the distinction be-
tween structural and individual rights provisions, arguing that the Bill of Rights has signifi-
cant structural components. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131 (1991) (contending that the Bill of Rights and the structural constitution have
more in common than is often belieyed).
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ments. 4 This division is intended to ameliorate the corrupting effect
of power. Thus, the powers delegated to each department are care-
fully limited in scope, and each of the three departments acts as a
check on the power of the others. In Madison's justly famous words,
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition."5 There is no
room for a fourth branch within this tripartite scheme of governance.
In exercising executive, legislative, and judicial power, administrative
agencies combine powers that the Constitution separates; moreover,
agencies are subject to none of the checks imposed upon the three
traditional departments. In short, the administrative state is
unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not invalidated the post-
New Deal administrative state as inconsistent with the constitutional
text. The Court's unwillingness to do so is, in large part, pragmatic.
Even if the Court were disposed to order the task of dismantling the
federal bureaucracy, it might not have the political capital necessary
to realize its objective. Moreover, to declare the administrative state
unconstitutional would require the Court to overrule an immense and
deeply rooted body of precedent. It is easy to understand that the
Court would be unwilling to adopt a constitutional theory with such
far-reaching implications.
This Article proposes a form of constitutional damage control:
the constitutional theory of the second best.6 Under this theory, the
Court should adhere to constitutional structures whenever possible-
the first best solution, as it were. Nonetheless, the Court should toler-
4 I use the term "department" rather than the more commonly used term, "branch,"
because the Constitution does so. SeeSteven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitaiy Executive, PluralJudiciay, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1155, 1156 n.6 ("The Con-
stitution uses the word 'Department' to refer to the three institutions of our national
government.").
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6 The term "theory of the second best" has its origin in economics. The first funda-
mental theorem of welfare economics is that when the economy meets the stringent re-
quirements of complete and perfectly competitive markets, the market equilibrium will be
Pareto optimal. If these stringent requirements are not met, however, correcting a single
market imperfection may not enhance welfare. The theory of the second best attempts to
evaluate how one might try to maximize welfare in the face of market imperfections. See
Kevin Lancaster & R.G. Lipsey, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. OF ECON. STUD.
11 (1956). Thus, under standard economic theory, the best economy is one in which in-
dustry is perfectly competitive (or in which all monopolists are perfect price discrimina-
tors). See KENNEm W. CLARKSON & ROGER L. MILLER, INDuSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, THEORY,
EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 132 (1982). However, where there are already some distor-
tions, the theory of the second best suggests that a monopoly in a second industry can, but
does not necessarily, make the economy more efficient. Id. The term "second best solu-
tion" has been more generally used to refer to solutions to problems that take into account
existing imperfections in the world and seek compensating imperfections. See e.g., Daniel
D. Polsby, Equal Protection, REASON, OCt. 1993, at 34, 38 (defending widespread gun owner-
ship by law-abiding citizens as a "second best solution" that would compensate for the
problem of gun ownership by predatory criminals).
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ate structures or practices that are conceded to be unconstitutional
when such structures or practices have become institutionalized. In so
doing, however, the Court should recognize that it is condoning de-
velopments that would be unconstitutional if considered as an origi-
nal matter. Where unconstitutional institutions are allowed to stand
based on a theory of precedent, the Court should allow (or even re-
quire) the creation of compensating institutions that seek to move
governmental structures closer to the constitutional equilibrium. In-
deed, the Court should allow or require these compensating institu-
tions even where they would have been unconstitutional if considered
standing alone. This approach, which permits the Court to fulfill its
obligation to constitutional principles, is a second best solution.
My example of an institution designed to compensate for prior
error is the legislative veto. The legislative veto would be unconstitu-
tional if considered as an original matter. However, open-ended dele-
gation of legislative authority to administrative agencies is also
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, such delegations have become suffi-
ciently entrenched in our society that it would be imprudent, if not
impossible, to invalidate them. Allowing the legislature to veto a regu-
lation enacted by an agency pursuant to such an open-ended delega-
tion serves constitutional objectives by imposing a check on agency
power. Moreover, such a veto operates as a surrogate for the bicam-
eral approval required to enact legislation. Thus, an open-ended del-
egation of legislative power together with the legislative veto is less
unconstitutional than an open-ended delegation of legislative power
standing alone. Accordingly, insofar as it compensates for an uncon-
stitutional delegation, the legislative veto should be allowed.
Part I of this Article discusses two current methods for analyzing
separation of powers issues-functionalism and formalism.7 The
Court has vacillated between these two methods of interpretation, but,
in fact, neither offers a satisfactory answer to the problems raised by
the administrative state. Functionalism should be rejected because it
amounts to no judicial review at all. Formalism offers rigorous judicial
review but is untenable because the gap between the formalist model
and our existing government is simply too wide. Of the two, however,
formalism is the more satisfactory approach.
Part II then offers an alternative theory-"modified formalism"-
that tries to solve the problems associated with the formalist approach.
Modified formalism integrates formalism with a "minimalist" theory of
precedent. Modified formalism requires that the Court adopt a for-
malist method whenever possible. In some cases, however, precedent
7 Gary Lawson, Tenitorial Governments and the Limits of Formulism, 78 CAui L. REv. 853,
857-61 (1990) (terms formalism and functionalism have become terms of art in the separa-
tion of powers context).
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has already departed from a formalist understanding of the Constitu-
tion. The formalist's response would be to seek the first best solution
of overruling wrongly decided precedent and returning to an inter-
pretation more consistent with the text. But because the modified
formalist adheres to a minimalist theory of precedent, which requires
a court to follow precedent that has become firmly entrenched, the
first best solution is not open to the formalist. The modified formal-
ist, therefore, adopts the second best solution of accepting such tex-
tual infidelities as given but subsequently interpreting the
Constitution to counteract the unconstitutional effects of the ques-
tionable precedent. Put simply, the modified formalist seeks to re-
store the constitutional equilibrium by allowing compensating
institutions whose purpose is to mitigate the effect of unconstitutional
institutions sanctioned by wrongly decided precedent. These com-
pensating institutions may be permitted under the theory of the sec-
ond best even if, standing alone, a formalist would be compelled to invalidate
them as unconstitutional.
Finally, Part III applies the theory of the second best to the issue
of the legislative veto. The legislative veto was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.8 However, where Congress has unconstitutionally delegated
legislative power to an agency, the delegation plus a legislative veto is
closer to the constitutional baseline than the unconstitutional delega-
tion would be standing alone. Accordingly, the legislative veto should,
under certain circumstances, be allowed.
I
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT INTERPRETIVE
TECHNIQUES
In recent years, the Supreme Court has faced a plethora of im-
portant separation of powers cases. 9 Indeed, one commentator has
8 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
9 Since 1976, such cases include Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501
U.S. 868 (1991) (upholding constitutionality of allowing "Article I" tax court judges to
appoint "special trial judges"); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abate-
ment of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a statutory provision
creating airport board of review including members of Congress); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of U.S. sentencing commission's
authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines); Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding constitutionality of law creating independent prosecutor not subject to execu-
tive department control); Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986) (upholding constitutionality of statutory provision authorizing the Commission to
hear some state law counterclaims); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating
portion of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act giving executive authority to Comptroller Gen-
eral, a legislative department official); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legisla-
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referred to the decade of the 1980s-when most of these cases were
decided-as "the most varied and sustained assault on the institu-
tional structure of the federal government in half a century."10 One
might expect that, with so much attention focused on separation of
powers issues, the Court would have developed a coherent separation
of powers jurisprudence. It has not done so.
There is general consensus among scholars that the Court has
exhibited a "split personality" in separation of powers cases." The
Court has alternated between an anything-goes functionalist method
that "appears to be designed to do little more than rationalize incur-
sions by one branch into the domain of another,"' 2 and a rigid but
principled formalist method that almost always leads to invalidation of
the challenged governmental action.' 3 There has been little explana-
tion or apparent rationale for the Court's flipping between these two
methods of analysis.
Moreover, neither functionalism nor formalism represents a com-
pletely satisfactory approach to separation of powers issues. Of the
two, functionalism poses the greater threat to the constitutional struc-
tures designed to protect individual liberty, check the exercise of
tive veto unconstitutional); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982) (holding unconstitutional portions of Bankruptcy Act givingjudicial power
to non-Article IIIjudges); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a
statutory provision giving rulemaking and adjudicative power to a commission including
members appointed directly by Congress).
10 Lawson, supra note 7, at 855. Professor Lawson's article was published prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Freytag, 501 U.S. 868. That decision suggests that the assault
on the institutional structure of the federal government may continue in this decade.
Nonetheless, the recent spate of separation of powers cases should not be read to suggest
that the foundations of the administrative state have come under attack. They have not.
As Professor Lawson has observed, "the essential features of the modem administrative
state have, for half a century, been taken as unchallengeable postulates by virtually all
players in the legal and political worlds, including the Reagan and Bush administrations."
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HAav. L. REv. 1231, 1232
(1994).
11 Martin H. Redish & ElizabethJ. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation'ofPowers Cases, 41 DuKE LJ. 449, 450 (1991). See also Rebecca
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513 (1991) (characterizing
the Court's separation of power jurisprudence as "an incoherent muddle"); E. Donald El-
liot, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal 37 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 507
(1989) (criticizing the Court for failing to develop a "coherent and useful" theory or "law"
of separation of powers); Lawson, supra note 7, at 854 ("These often sharply divided deci-
sions employed a bewildering array of inconsistent methodologies, alternately raising and
dashing the hopes both of formalists ... who advocate strict adherence to the Constitu-
tion's particular tripartite structure and of functionalists who urge flexibility to accommo-
date the modem administrative state."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. CT. REV. 225, 226 ("The Court has alternated between the
formal and functional constructions .... ").
12 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 450.
13 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 1233-49 for a discussion of the original ways in which
the administrative state is inconsistent with a formalist constitutional model.
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power, and assure governmental accountability. Formalism, while
faithful to constitutional text, is incomplete-or inadequate-because
it fails to bridge the gap between modem administrative government
and the formalist paradigm.
A. Functionalism Rejected
Functionalists purport to be concerned with whether a particular
exercise of power by one department illegitimately interferes with the
"core function"' 4 of another department. Central to this inquiry is the
issue of whether one department is attempting to "aggrandize" itself
at the expense of another.' 5 Thus, functionalists are not inclined to
worry about the exercise of governmental authority by actors outside of
the three named departments.' 6 Likewise, functionalists are willing to
accommodate substantial innovation below the apex of governmental
structure.' 7 Ultimately, the functionalist model accepts any distribu-
tion of power so long as it does not "undermine the intended distribu-
tion of authority" among the President, Congress, and the judiciary.' 8
The "Fourth Branch" therefore does not trouble the functional-
ists.' 9 Because it takes most of the administrative state as a given, func-
tionalism is more "realistic" than formalism-or at least more
consistent with the status quo. Despite the Court's wavering, 20 func-
14 Harold Krent, Separating the Strands In Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L.
REv. 1253, 1255 (1988).
15 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (focussing on the ag-
grandizement issue).
16 Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 596 (1984).
17 Id. at 580 (Because the heads of regulatory bodies purportedly do not "present the
threat that led the framers to insist on a splitting of the authority of government at its very
top[,] ... it is not terribly important to number or allocate the horses that pull the car-
riage of government.").
18 Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CoRNELL L. Rxv. 488, 494 (1987).
19 See id. at 518.
20 Personnel changes alone cannot account for the Court's doctrinal split personality.
The Court has, within short spans of time, decided cases using both formalist and function-
alist methods. The Court's most recent formalist decision was Metropolitan Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991), where the Court
struck down a statute allowing nine Members of Congress to serve as a Board of Review
with veto power over decisions made by a regional airport authority. Ten days after decid-
ing Metropolitan Airports, the Court handed down Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), in which the Court employed a functionalist approach to allow
the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (a so-called "Article I court") to appoint
special trialIjudges. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the Court, using a formalist
approach, struck down portions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Bowsherwas decided
the same day as Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), where
the Court applied a functionalist approach to uphold the jurisdiction of the Commission
to hear certain state-law counterclaims.
[Vol. 80:1
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tionalism has been somewhat more prevalent than formalism in the
Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence.2'
Nevertheless, the functionalist approach should be rejected for
three reasons. First, functionalism lacks sufficient critical bite: Once
a court adopts a functionalist methodology, "no meaningful limita-
tions on interbranch usurpation of power remain."22 For example,
Justice White, who adopted the most consistently functionalist meth-
odology of any member of the Court,23 consistently refused to hold
that separation of powers principles had been violated, except in the
most extreme circumstances.2 4 The reason for the functionalists' un-
willingness to strike down almost any institution on separation of pow-
ers grounds is simple. The functionalist notions of "core functions"
and "aggrandizement" are so vague and indeterminate that "the judi-
cial reaction will almost always be to defer to the judgments of other
branches when separation of powers controversies arise."25 Thus,
functionalism is tantamount to a complete lack of judicial review.
21 See Lawson, supra note 7, at 856 n.12 ("[T]he Functionalists clearly won the decade
[of the 1980s], at least in the Courts and Congress, by a TKO."). Of the important separa-
tion of powers cases cited supra note 9, Synar, Chadha, and Metropolitan Airports employ a
formalist approach; Freytag, Mistretta, Morrison, and Schor use a functionalist methodology,
and Northern Pipeline is difficult to categorize (although categorizing Northern Pipeline, in
which the Court rejected a delegation of Article III power to non-Article IIjudges may be
a moot issue in light of the Court's willingness to legitimate the exercise of the judicial
power by Article I courts in Freytag and Schor). Cf Lawson, supra note 7, at 854 n.4 (classify-
ing the Court's leading separation of powers cases according to whether the decisions are
formalist, functionalist, both or neither). Although the Court has occasionally applied a
formalist methodology, it is worth observing that the Court has not applied such a method-
ology in any case where doing so would imperil the existence or power of the administra-
tive state.
22 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 454.
23 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 227 n.11 (describing Justice White as "the one Justice
who has steadfastly endorsed a functional approach").
24 The only such extreme case of which I am aware is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 271
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where Justice White agreed that a
statute giving Congress the power to select members of the Federal Election Commission
violated the Appointments Clause. In every other case, however, Justice White was willing
to give substantial leeway to Congress to shape the structure of the government. See, e.g.,
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868 (Blackmun,J., Opinion of the Court, joined by Justice White) (vot-
ing to uphold statutory provision giving "Article Ijudges" power under the Appointments
Clause); Metropolitan Airports, 501 U.S. at 277 (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from
Court's invalidation of statute requiring state to create regional airports authority with
members of Congress serving as members); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 362 (Blackmun, J., Opin-
ion of the Court, joined by White, J.) (voting to uphold U.S. Sentencing Commission);
Morlison, 487 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, CJ., Opinion of the Court, joined by White, J.)
(voting to uphold independent counsel law); Schor, 478 U.S. at 835 (O'ConnorJ., Opinion
of the Court, joined White, J.) (voting to allow CFrC to adjudicate state-law counter-
claims); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision
preventing Congressional official, Comptroller General, from exercising executive author-
ity); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's decision hold-
ing legislative veto unconstitutional); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92 (dissenting from
decision holding unconstitutional Article I Bankruptcy Courts).
25 Merrill, supra note 11, at 234-35.
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Second, despite its superficial worldliness, functionalism does not
appreciate the corrupting effect of power. Functionalism accommo-
dates well-intentioned innovations designed to circumvent the consti-
tutional system of balanced and separated powers in order to
overcome a complex, cumbersome, and inefficient method of govern-
ance. In the process, however, functionalism has allowed concentra-
tions of virtually unchecked power to pervade a system whose design
was largely driven by an almost paranoid distrust of political power:
"Almost every aspect of [the Framers'] political structure was in some
way related to their implicit assumption that, simply put, 'power cor-
rupts.' "26 The functionalist insistence that concentrations of power
below the apex of governmental authority are not important is, conse-
quently, inconsistent with the Framers' understanding of the tendency
of officials to abuse their power. The functionalist notion of aggran-
dizement and its tendency to accommodate violations of separation of
powers principles below the apex of governmental authority therefore
fails adequately to protect the constitutional structures that protect
individual liberty.
Finally, functionalists only worry when one department tries to
take power at the expense of another. They do not worry when a
department has some power taken away from it-as long as that
power does not go to one of the other coordinate departments. Yet
the abdication of power and its corresponding responsibilities is as
serious a problem as aggrandizement. The decision of the German
Reichstag to relinquish power in 1933 was lamentable not merely be-
cause it allowed the Chancellor-Adolph Hitler-to aggrandize his
position at the expense of the legislature but also because it involved
legislative abdication.27 If the Congress were to cede all power to an
administrative agency in a single legislative act, its decision to do so
would be lamentable because it would spell the end of legislative ac-
countability, and therefore of constitutional self-government. The
principle remains the same if abdication is accomplished piecemeal.
Thus, because it fails to appreciate and counteract the danger inher-
ent in abdication, functionalism should be rejected outright.
B. Formalism: A Qualified Defense
The traditional alternative to functionalism is formalism. As in
legal discourse generally, formalism in the separation of powers con-
text involves the application of more or less rigid rules, rather than
26 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 451.
27 See KARL D. BRACHER, THE GERMAN DICTAToRSHIP 210-11 (1970); WILLu~A L.
SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 273-78 (1950).
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flexible standards, to legal problems.28 Although the formalist might
agree that the separation of powers serves certain goals, the goals are
not directly invoked by the formalist in resolving separation of powers
cases. Rather, the constitutional text is seen as an "instruction man-
ual" which prescribes particular allocations of power.2 9 The three
"vesting" clauses 30 "establish[ ] a complete division of otherwise unal-
located federal governmental authority among the constitutionally
specified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions."3' Formalism
"uses a syllogistic, definitional approach to determining whether a
particular exercise of power is legislative, executive, or judicial. It as-
sumes that all exercises of power must fall into one of these categories
and takes no ostensible account of the practicalities of administration
in arriving at this determination."32 Thus, under the formalist para-
digm, "the constitutional validity of a particular branch action, from
the perspective of separation of powers, is to be determined not by
resort to functional balancing, but solely by the use of a definitional
analysis."33 No commingling of legislative, executive, or judicial
power is permissible, except where specifically provided in the consti-
tutional text.3 4
Any defense of formalism will encounter some resistance.3 5
Nonetheless, a formalist approach to separation of powers problems
28 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) ("At the heart of the
word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking accord-
ing to rule.").
29 Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. Rnv. 21, 22 (1988).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... ."); U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
31 Lawson, supra note 7, at 857-58. Ever the functionalist, Justice White could always
be counted on to decry the Court's unwillingness to take into account pragmatic adminis-
trative concerns whenever it undertook one of its periodic forays into formalism. See, e.g.,
Metropolitan Airports, 501 U.S. at 277 (White, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court strikes down
yet another innovative and otherwise lawful governmental experiment in the name of sepa-
ration of powers."); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759 (White,J, dissenting) (characterizing majority
decision as "distressingly formalistic"). The formalist response to such pragmatic argu-
ments is that they are irrelevant. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944 ("[T]he fact that a given law
or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.").
32 Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olsen: A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court Was
Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 343 (1989).
33 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 454.
34 The Constitution does provide for some interaction between the three depart-
ments of government. Most notably, the so-called "presentment" provision, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 3, gives the President a role in lawmaking. See infra note 37.
35 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 453-54 ("Any call for a return to 'formalism' in
constitutional interpretation will naturally expose one to the barrage of ridicule and dis-
dain traditionally reserved by modem scholars for what is almost universally deemed to be
an epistimologically naive methodology.").
1994]
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has much to commend it. Most importantly, a formalist approach is
the one most consistent with the text of the Constitution.3 6 The struc-
tural provisions of the Constitution look like an instruction manual.
They set forth the role of each department and the modes of interac-
tion among the three departments. 37 There would be no point to
these elaborate provisions if Congress were free to prescribe extra-tex-
tual modes of governance.
Moreover, the formalist approach furthers the policies behind
the separation of powers more than functionalism, which requires the
Court to determine on a case-by-case basis if the policies behind the
separation of powers are threatened.38 The constitutional system of
balanced and separated powers serves primarily to protect against
abuse of governmental authority, or "tyranny." However, it is unclear,
36 Regardless of their view of the proper method of reading the Constitution, most
scholars would agree that the constitutional text is a source of authority. See, MICHAEL
PERRY, MoRALIry Poirics & LAW, 131 (1987) ("[I]n American political-legal culture it is
axiomatic that the constitutional text is authoritative-indeed supremely authoritative-in
constitutional adjudication.").
37 Some have argued that formalism is unworkable because it is impossible, in princi-
ple, to ascertain whether a particular exercise of power is legislative, executive, or judicial.
SeeBrown, supra note 11, at 1524 (dismissing the formalist view that tasks can be defined as
legislative, executive, or judicial as a "highly questionable premise"). To be sure, certain
tasks may not obviously pertain to any particular department. In such instance, characteri-
zation of the task as legislative, executive, or judicial turns on the identity of the actor
charged with that task. I believe, however, that it is possible, within certain limitations, to
define the nature of legislative, executive, and judicial power and therefore definitively to
allocate certain tasks to one or another particular department. Such an undertaking is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article.
The Constitution itself provides for some blending of tasks. For example, the Presi-
dent's power to sign or veto legislation, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3, appears more legisla-
tive than executive. See Lawson, supra note 7, at 858 n.19 (noting that the President's
power to veto legislation would normally be characterized as legislative and crediting Bob
Bennett with this insight). In fact, however, Woodrow Wilson beat them both to the
punch. See WooDRow WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 53 (World Pub. Co. 1956)
(1885) ("For in the exercise of his power of veto, which is, of course, beyond all compari-
son, his most formidable prerogative, the President acts not as the executive but as a third
branch of the legislature.").
There is, of course, a deeper objection to any rule-based theory of constitutional inter-
pretation. Some have argued that it is either impossible or undesirable for judges to em-
ploy more or less rigid and determinate rules to resolve legal disputes. See Anthony
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1990); Mark Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down, 96 HARv. L. Rxv. 781 (1983). Others have taken issue with the claim
that legal rules are radically indeterminate. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 283 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). Any discus-
sion of this issue is obviously well outside the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that I
believe that reasonably determinate rules are both possible and desirable, and will proceed
on that assumption.
38 This argument is similar to arguments advanced by rule utilitarians. Rule utilitari-
ans argue that one should follow utility-maximizing rules rather than attempting to deter-
mine, in each individual instance, the utility-maximizing course of action because it may be
difficult or impossible to make this determination in a particular case. See JOHN HosPERS,
HuMAN CONDUCT 217-32 (2d ed. 1961).
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in advance, whether a structure that violates the constitutional
blueprint is a benign innovation or a malignant threat to liberty. Con-
sequently, as Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar have pointed out, the
constitutional principle of separation of powers is "inherently prophy-
lactic."3 9 "The concept of a prophylactic is that it prevents the crea-
tion of a critical situation by proceeding on the assumption that it will
be impossible to determine, in the individual instance, the existence
of a real threat to the values sought to be fostered."40 It is therefore
unwise to resolve separation of powers cases according to the func-
tionalist model, on a case-by-case basis. Rather, the point of separation
of powers jurisprudence is to be rigid and inflexible. The very rigidity
of formalism, then, recommends it as the proper mode of interpreta-
tion in separation of powers cases.
There is, however, one overriding problem with formalism as a
method for evaluating current structures. Under a pure formalist ap-
proach, most, if not all, of the administrative state is unconstitutional.
Agency rulemaking and adjudication-indeed, the very existence of
some agencies-is inconsistent with the formalist model.41 Formal-
ism, therefore, is "simply incapable of describing the government we
have."42 A useful theory of interpretation must, however, take at least
some of our current government as a given. Prudence dictates some
accommodation of administrative government. At this point, then,
application of undiluted formalism would be unsound and
unworkable.
In sum, the problem is that formalism is too principled and rigid
while functionalism is not principled or rigid enough. Of the two,
however, formalism is the more promising. Formalism is both more
consistent with the constitutional text and better able to satisfy the
goals of separation of powers-accountability and, most importantly,
protection against governmental tyranny. The trouble with formalism
is the distance between the formalist view and currently accepted prac-
tices. The gap can, however, be bridged by a theory of precedent-a
theory which this Article will now proceed to outline.
39 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 477.
40 Id.
41 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 96-97 (applying
the "neoclassical approach," which is at least in the same ballpark with formalism, to con-
clude that "[t]he independent agency is a constitutional sport, an anomalous institution
created without regard to the basic principle of separation of powers upon which our gov-
ernment was founded").
42 Strauss, supra note 18, at 526.
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II
TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST
Most formalists are willing-at least implicitly-to accept some
notion of precedent.43 What formalists have failed to do, however, is
to develop a theory of precedent that explains how precedent should
interact with the formalist approach in deciding separation of powers
questions. This Part proposes a theory of precedent-the "minimal-
ist" theory of precedent-and integrates that theory of precedent into
the formalist model, resulting in what I have labelled "modified
formalism."
A. The Minimalist Theory of Precedent
Under the minimalist theory of precedent, the Court normally
ignores precedent in deciding constitutional cases. However, where a
decision approving an unconstitutional structure or practice has be-
come institutionalized, the Court allows that decision to stand. None-
theless, in so doing, the Court acknowledges that the structure or
practice would be unconstitutional if it were considered as a matter of
first impression. The minimalist theory of precedent accurately de-
scribes the Supreme Court's approach to precedent in constitutional
cases. In addition, that theory is justified on normative grounds.
1. The Supreme Court and Precedent: A Descriptive Analysis
In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willing-
ness to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis by overturning or
significantly modifying its own precedents. Indeed, Earl Maltz states
baldly that "[ilt seems fair to say that if a majority of the Warren or
Burger Court has considered a case wrongly decided, no constitu-
tional precedent-new or old-has been safe. '44 Professor Maltz ba-
ses his conclusion largely on statistical data purportedly
demonstrating an increased willingness of the Court to ignore its own
43 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 234 ("[F]ormalists are forced to adopt a grandfather
strategy, preserving past deviations from formalist purity (like administrative agencies)
based on stare decisis or a principle of historical settlement, while subjecting new innova-
tions to scrutiny under a rigorous exclusive functions canon."). One exception to this rule
is Gary Lawson, who is convinced that following wrongly decided precedent is affirmatively
unconstitutional. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv.J. L. &
PuB. POL'Y 23 (1994). A detailed response to Lawson's view of precedent is outside of the
scope of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that were it not for his idiosyncratic view
of precedent, Lawson would agree with the thesis of this Article. See Lawson, supra note 10,
at 1253 ("If there is any proper role for precedent in constitutional theory, McCutchen is
probably right; if an incorrect precedent creates a constitutional disequilibrium, it is fool-
ish to proceed as though one were still in an equilibrium state.").
44 Carl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980
Wisc. L. REv. 467, 467.
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precedent.45 However, Justice Stevens has taken issue with this
claim.46 While conceding that the Court has overruled itself more fre-
quently in recent years, he nonetheless contends "that the report of
the death of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is exaggerated.' 47
Both Professor Maltz and Justice Stevens have a point. But who is
right? There is no widely accepted, doctrinally coherent theory of
constitutional stare decisis.48 Certainly, plenty of cases make lauda-
tory noises about stare decisis. 49 But these cases do not specify when
the Court is obliged to follow precedent. Rather, the decision to in-
voke stare decisis is a "prudential" one, which means that it is gener-
ally not governed by rules.50  And, to the extent that there is a
45 Professor Maltz noted that:
In the twelve-year period from 1937 to 1949, for example, the Court over-
ruled earlier constitutional decisions in twenty-one cases-nearly as many
as in the 140 years preceding Coronado Oil & Gas. By 1959, the number of
instances in which the Court had reversals involving constitutional issues
had grown to sixty; in the two decades which followed, the Court overruled
constitutional cases on no less than forty-seven occasions.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Maltz provides a compendium of cases overruling con-
stitutional precedent between 1960 and 1979. Id. at 494-96. See also Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828 n.1 (1991) (listing 33 constitutional cases during 1971-1991 terms in
which the Court overruled itself). I will leave to other toilers in the scholarly vineyard the
task of compiling a comprehensive tabulation of all the constitutional cases in which the
Supreme Court has overruled itself. In any event, such a compendium of cases that have
been overruled may understate the Court's willingness to ignore or significantly alter pre-
cedent. For example, when read together, Freytag, 501 U.S. 868, and Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
leave the status of Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, in doubt. See supra note 21. Accordingly,
the issue of whether a case has been overruled or limited may, itself, be ambiguous.
46 John P. Stevens, The Life Span of aJudge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (1983).
47 Id.
48 See ROBERT BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 155-57 (1990) (The question of prece-
dent lies "[a]t the center of the philosophy of original understanding," but "[t]he law
currently has no very firm theory of when precedent should be followed and when it may
be ignored or overruled."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Deci-
sions, 73 COMEL L. REv. 422, 422 (1988) ("[A]lthough the academy is awash with compet-
ing theories of substantive law, there is no contest in the theory of stare decisis .... [N] o
one has a principled theory to offer."). Judge Reinhardt has suggested that the problem of
stare decisis is at least as complex as the problem ofjudging generally. Stephen Reinhardt,
The Conflict Between Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 434,
435 (1988) ("[Stare decisis] raises all the issues inherent in the question, 'How should a
judge reach decisions?' "). Despite the lack of any coherent theory of stare decisis, how-
ever, most commentators, even originalists, are willing to accept some notion of stare deci-
sis. See BORiK, supra, at 155-59 (arguing that some notion of precedent is consistent with
originalist theories of constitutional law); Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication. 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988) (same).
49 See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1986)
("[T]he doctrine of stare decisisis of fundamental importance to the rule of law."); Akron v.
Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983) ("[T]he doctrine of stare
decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine
that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law.").
50 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) ("[W]hen this
Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of pru-
dential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
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doctrine of constitutional stare decisis, that doctrine leans in favor of
overruling.
The modem trend is to deemphasize stare decisis in constitu-
tional cases. Justice Brandeis, in his frequently quoted dissent in Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,51 identified two competing values that
must be balanced in determining whether or not to invoke stare deci-
sis, and suggested that the proper resolution of the conflict between
them might depend on the character of the case:
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of resjudicata, a [rule of] universal,
inexorable command. "The rule of stare decisis, though one tending
to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely
within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to
consider a question once decided." Stare decisis is usually the wise
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the appli-
cable rule be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly
true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Fed-
eral Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions.52
Thus, in confronting questions of stare decisis, courts face a choice
between getting the rule right and getting the rule settled. Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Coronado suggests that the Court has particularly
wide latitude to get the rule right and overrule precedent in constitu-
tional cases.
In a number of recent high-profile cases, the Court has done just
that.53 Payne v. Tennessee54 exemplifies this willingness to overrule a
prior case solely on the basis that it was wrongly decided, thereby bol-
stering Professor Maltz's argument. In Payne, the Court held that "vic-
tim impact" evidence could be admitted during the sentencing phase
of a capital punishment proceeding.55 In so doing, it overturned a
decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming
and overruling a prior case."). In other words, the Court can do whatever it wants.
51 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (quoting Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910)) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
53 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers 490 U.S. 805 (1989)); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (overruling A Book Named John Clelund's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)). The Court has even accomplished a
particularly noteworthy double reversal. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1989) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976))
and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
54 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
55 Id. at 808.
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rule announced only four years before in Booth v. Maryland,56 which
was subsequently reaffirmed in South Carolina v. Gathers57 in 1989.
The Court did make noises about stare decisis. 58 But it then took full
advantage of the considerable slack in stare decisis jurisprudence.
First, the Court cited Coronado to minimize the import of stare decisis
in constitutional law.59 Then, because both Gathers and Booth "were
decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents, challeng-
ing the basic underpinnings of these decisions"60 the Court deter-
mined that it was free to overrule them.
This rationale for overruling is pretty thin. Justice Marshall, os-
tensibly dissenting on stare decisis grounds, correctly observed that
nothing had changed since Booth and Gathers were decided except the
personnel of the Court.6' Still, Justice Marshall's reverence for stare
decisis rang a bit hollow. Justice Marshall himself never hesitated to
call for overturning precedent that he thought wrongly decided.62 In
fact, he voted to overrule precedent in every capital case to come
before the Court, despite clear and repeated holdings that capital
punishment was not cruel and unusual under all circumstances. 63 It is
56 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
57 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
58 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.").
59 501 U.S. at 809 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 285 U.S. 393, 406-07
(1933) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
60 Id. at 810. The Court also cited an Ohio decision, State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d
1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990) for the proposition that "[t]he fact that the majority and two
dissenters all interpret the opinions and footnotes in Booth and Gathers differently demon-
strates the uncertainty of law in this area." Id. If disagreements about the implications of a
decision constitute a sufficient basis for overruling, then a lot of decisions are in danger.
Moreover, Booth was decided only a few years prior to Payne. If doctrinal coherence were
the real issue, the Court could have clarified the doctrine rather than eliminate it. There
was certainly no evidence that the Court was somehow incapable of developing a coherent
body of law on the issue of victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of capital cases.
61 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
62 See id. at 833 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (citing examples wherejustice Marshall called
for the overruling of precedent). The justices who composed the majority voting to over-
rule Booth and Gathers differed somewhat in the degree of respect that they exhibited to-
ward constitutional stare decisis. Predictably, justice Scalia showed the least respect for
precedent. He explicitly rejected the contention advanced by the dissent that a "special
justification" is required to overturn wrongly decided precedent. Id. He thought it suffi-
cient that the rule announced in Booth "significantly harms our justice system and is egre-
giously wrong." Id. Thus,Justice Scalia is effectively on record as defending, on normative
grounds, the position advanced by Professor Maltz as a description of Supreme Court prac-
tice. Justice Souter, by contrast, agreed withJustice Marshall that a "special justification" is
required to overrule constitutional precedent, but he believed that such justification was
present in Payne. Id. at 842 (Souter,j., concurring). A cynic might wonder whether justice
Souter will ever fiail to find such ajustification when he wants to overrule a prior case.
63 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment),justice Marshall expressed his view that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
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highly unlikely that Justice Marshall would have refused to join four
other justices willing to abolish the death penalty if changes in the
Court's personnel had led to a Court more amenable to his philoso-
phy. In sum, there is little question that Justice Marshall would have
dissented in Payne even if precedent had pointed in the opposite di-
rection. Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude that precedent did not
control anyone's vote in Payne. As in many other constitutional cases,
the discussion of precedent was nothing more than a rhetorical
sideshow.64
Nonetheless, precedent may at times have a real impact on the
Court's decisions. An excellent example of a case where precedent
did appear to influence the outcome is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.65
In Casey, a sharply divided Supreme Court chose not to overrule Roe v.
Wade.66 In so doing, the plurality opinion devoted a great deal of at-
tention to the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court found that cultural
and societal reliance interests that had clustered around the protec-
tion of abortion rights required the application of stare decisis. 67 Of
course, it is impossible to know for sure whether stare decisis was a
necessary condition for the decision or merely rhetorical justification
for it. But it seems unlikely that Justice Kennedy, for example, would
have voted with the majority if he had been a member of the Court
when Roe was decided.68 It is therefore reasonable to infer that stare
punishment under all circumstances. This view was rejected by the Court in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Marshall called for the overruling of precedent from
then on, based solely on his view that the Court was wrong. Justice Marshall went so far as
to dissent from the denial of certiorari in every death penalty case. Se4 e.g., Mapes v. Ohio,
498 U.S. 977 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari)
("Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would grant the
application for stay of execution and the petition for a writ of certiorari and would vacate
the death sentence in this case.") (citation omitted).
64 See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261 (1980); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977); see also supra note 53 (listing a few of the recent cases where the Supreme Court has
overruled itself).
65 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, _U., plurality opinion).
66 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67 112 S. Ct. at 2809. As the Court explained, "for two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abor-
tion .... The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." Id. The
Court conceded that such reliance was difficult to quantify. I& Still, the Court believed
that it was real enough to require that it be respected. Id
68 Justice Kennedy joined the Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which came to the brink of overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), but postponed direct reconsideration of the issue for another day. Justice
Kennedy and Justice White were the only ones who joined one portion of Chief Justice
[Vol. 80:1
SECOND BEST
decisis concerns influenced him to vote with the five-justice majority,
and that, by extension, the outcome of the case turned on stare
decisis.
Taken together, Payne and Casey reveal that the Court has, in
practice, adopted what might be called a "minimalist" theory of consti-
tutional stare decisis. Under this theory, the Court will not hesitate to
overrule a case that it believes to have been wrongly decided unless
that case has spawned numerous subsidiary institutions and created
reliance interests and settled expectations.
Thus, there are a number of cases that, no matter how wrongly
decided, will not be overturned. A credible argument could be made,
for example, that the Legal Tender Cases were wrongly decided.6 9 But
governmental policy, our banking system, and the economy as a whole
are all premised on the holding that the government may print paper
money which is legal tender. The Legal Tender Cases are integral to the
shape of our political, constitutional, and economic order institutions.
Thus, even if five members of the Supreme Court (or nine, for that
matter) were to "see the light" with respect to the Legal Tender Cases,
the Court is not about to require the federal government to withdraw
paper money from circulation and begin minting gold coins. 70 As
Robert Bork-a man less than enamored with stare decisis-has put
it, 'Whatever might have been the proper ruling shortly after the Civil
War, if a judge today were to decide that paper money is unconstitu-
tional, we would think he ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk
but by a guardian." 71
Likewise, the cases that have allowed the administrative state to
flourish will not be overruled. Neither the cases sanctioning open-
ended delegations of legislative power72 nor those broadly interpret-
ing the commerce clause73 will be overturned. Nor will such lumi-
Rehnquist's opinion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 513-22. Notably, then-Justices Rehnquist and
White were the sole dissenters in Roe, 410 U.S. at 171.
69 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457 (1871). Whether the Legal Tender Cases were decided cor-
rectly is irrelevant. Rather, my point is that, assuming the cases to have been wrongly
decided, they will not be overruled.
70 Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that the Court would even grant a petition for a
writ of certiorari in a case in which a party challenged the issuance of paper money.
71 Bouc, supra note 48, at 155.
72 See infra notes 150-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nondelegation
doctrine.
73 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that grain raised on a
farm for household use "affects" interstate commerce and is therefore within Congress's
power under the commerce clause). The scope of power now exercised by the federal
government is difficult to justify on constitutional grounds. The powers granted to the
federal government by the Constitution do not "alone or in combination, grant[ ] the
federal government anything remotely resembling a general jurisdiction over citizens' af-
fairs." Lawson, supra note 10, at 1234. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 VA L. Ray. 1387 (1987) (arguing for a limited reading of the commerce
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naries as Richard Epstein, 74 Bernard Siegan, 75 or Steven Macedo 76
convince the Court to return to Lochner77 era invalidation of economic
regulation. Even Justice Scalia-the Justice most receptive to the for-
malist approach-has demonstrated no willingness to attack the basic
tenets of the administrative state.78
Thus, the Court has implicitly adopted a "minimalist" theory of
constitutional stare decisis. Under the minimalist theory, stare decisis
is relevant to a constitutional case only to the extent that patterns of
institutional, cultural, and private reliance interests have clustered
around a particular decision, and then only to the extent of such reli-
ance interests.
2. Wen the Court Should Do the Wrong Thing: A Normative
Analysis
In addition to being an accurate description of Supreme Court
practice, the minimalist theory of stare decisis is also justified on nor-
mative grounds. As noted above, the traditional approach had been
to deemphasize the importance of precedent in constitutional law. In
balancing Justice Brandeis's two competing values-the value of get-
ting a rule settled and the value of getting it right-the traditional
approach had elevated accuracy far above stability in constitutional
cases. While it is important to get the rule right, the traditional ap-
proach is inferior to minimalist theory because only the minimalist
theory gives sufficient weight to the need for certain constitutional
issues to be settled. Indeed, the interests that underlie Article V's dif-
clause). Yet, despite the commands of the text, few today take the enumerated powers
doctrine seriously. Indeed, "in this day and age, discussing the doctrine of enumerated
powers is like discussing the redemption of Imperial Chinese bonds." Lawson, supra note
10, at 1236. Even the most minimal challenges to the federal government's power meet
powerful opposition. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit recently held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could not regulate
as 'wetlands' a small depression that sometimes filled with rainwater in which birds might
stop to have a sip (there was no evidence that any birds had actually availed themselves of
this opportunity). Even this modest limitation was too much; the opinion was vacated and
the EPA lost on grounds that did not undermine its power. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.), vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992).
74 See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
75 See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITJTION (1980).
76 See STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
77 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state law regulating the
hours of bakery workers violated substantive due process rights). This case ushered in an
era in which the Court limited the states' ability to regulate economic matters.
78 AlthoughJustice Scalia has dissented in a number of separation of powers cases, he
has demonstrated at least some willingness to accommodate the administrative state. For
example, in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta, Justice Scalia indicates an unwillingness to
find a violation of the nondelegation doctrine based solely on the vagueness of a congres-
sional mandate. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416.
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ficult amendment process counsel in favor of a rule of constitutional
stare decisis. 79 One purpose of the Constitution was to provide a sta-
ble set of institutions around which political interactions could take
place. This purpose militates in favor of a strong doctrine of constitu-
tional stare decisis: "Precisely because constitutional rules establish
governmental structures, because they are the framework for all polit-
ical interactions, it ought to be harder to revise them than to change
statutory rules. The reasons making amendment hard apply also to
overruling."80 To the extent that certain constitutional rulings estab-
lish structural ground rules, political actors must be able to rely upon
the stability of these rulings. Hence, the minimalist theory of stare
decisis is more consistent with constitutionalism than is the traditional
approach.
The minimalist theory of precedent also has parallels in other
areas of the law. Justice Scalia has described the continuation of
wrongly decided precedent as "a sort of intellectual adverse posses-
sion."81 He may have meant this comment as a quip, but adverse pos-
session might be an instructive way to think about the question of
precedent. The rules of adverse possession insulate an adverse posses-
sor who is, by definition, a usurper against the claims of the true
owner.8 2 While it may seem "wrong" to allow an adverse possessor to
take possession of-and title to-property, we do so in order to pro-
tect reliance interests and settled expectation.83 It is also efficient to
do so because adverse possessors can make both financial and per-
sonal investment in a piece of property.84 Moreover, another level of
reliance is added when third parties, such as creditors, rely on the
adverse possessor's property interest.85
79 See Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 431. See also, Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1344, 1355-59 (1990).
80 Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 431.
81 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265
(1987).
82 Adverse possession, at common law, must be "1) actual, 2) open and notorious, 3)
hostile, 4) exclusive, and 5) continuous." ROGER A. CUNNINCHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY 758 (1984). Some courts also require that a claim be based on a claim of right, or that
it be made in good faith. Id. As a practical matter, courts generally do not allow an adverse
possessor to take title where there has been bad faith. R.W. Heimholz, Adverse Possession
and Subjective Inten 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 347 (1983).
83 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in
the Libertarian Model of Properly Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986) (discussing inconsis-
tency of adverse possession and perpetuities law with libertarian conceptions of property
rights).
84 For a good discussion of both types of reliance, see Thomas W. Merrill, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1122, 1131 (1985). See also
Margaret Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739 (1983) (discussing
relationship between property and personhood).
85 Merrill, supra note 84, at 1132.
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Similarly, precedent insulates wrongly decided cases (the adverse
possessor) from the correct decision (the true owner). While this ob-
stacle to faithful interpretation may seem "wrong," the minimalist the-
ory of constitutional stare decisis serves to protect reliance interests
that have built up around particular decisions. Decisions that have
created institutional structures integral to the form of the federal gov-
ernment as we know it have become effectively irreversible because
they are so deeply rooted in our political and legal culture that to
overrule them would undermine the very social stability that the Con-
stitution is supposed to foster.
B. Modified Formalism
The minimalist theory of precedent provides the mediating prin-
ciple between the formalist method of analyzing separation of powers
issues and the reality of the modem administrative state. Under what
I call the "modified formalist" approach, the Court begins, as it does
in applying the formalist approach, by determining whether a chal-
lenged practice is consistent with a formalist interpretation of the con-
stitutional text. But unlike formalism, modified formalism does not
end there. If a court applying modified formalism determines that a
practice is not consistent with the formalist understanding of the con-
stitutional text, it must next ask if the practice at issue is one that has
been sanctioned by prior constitutional doctrine and if the practice
has become institutionalized. If both questions can be answered in
the affirmative, the Court, applying the minimalist theory of prece-
dent, should allow the challenged practice to continue. The Court,
therefore, follows wrongly decided precedent (that is, precedent in-
consistent with a formalist reading of the text) only when a failure to
do so would cause significant institutional disruption.
C. Textual Fidelity and the Search for Second Best Solutions
Under modified formalism, then, there is a range of cases where
the Court should knowingly, intentionally, consciously, and honestly
do the wrong thing for the sake of institutional stability. The modi-
fied formalist accepts the necessity of following wrongly decided pre-
cedent but does not relish that necessity or consider it a virtue. Nor
does the Court assert the correctness of incorrect decisions. Instead,
the Court recognizes that the chosen path would be unconstitutional
if considered as a matter of first impression.
Following wrongly decided precedent is particularly troublesome
in the separation of powers context. In order to prevent tyranny, the
Constitution divides power both between the state and federal govern-
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ments, and among the three departments of the federal
govemment:8 6
By simultaneously dividing power among the three branches and
institutionalizing methods that allow each branch to check the
others, the Constitution reduces the likelihood that one faction or
interest group that has managed to obtain control of one branch
will be able to implement its political agenda in contravention of
the wishes of the people. By dividing power on a vertical as well as
lateral plane (i.e. between the state and federal governments), they
sought to assure that not all policy decisions would be made at one
political level. And by implementing a diluted form of popular sov-
ereignty, they assured that those in power would be generally re-
sponsive to those they represent while reducing the danger of a
tyrannical majority. 87
This well-crafted allocation of power is disturbed by wrongly decided
precedent. Decisions that either realign power among the three de-
partments or alter the powers of one department endanger this
balance.
The modified formalist responds to this threat to liberty with a
constitutional theory of the second best. The constitutional theory of
the second best seeks to preserve the constitutional structure by offset-
ting institutions that have been erroneously strengthened and by
strengthening institutions weakened by a prior error. Invocation of
the constitutional theory of the second best is triggered by an institu-
tion or practice that is both unconstitutional under formalism and
irreversible under modified formalism. If such a "triggering error"
throws the system as a whole out of balance in a systematic and pre-
dictable manner, the second best solution is to establish an institution
or practice capable of compensating for the triggering error (a "com-
pensating institution").88
The Court is required to seek a second best solution because its
duty is to the balance of power embodied in the constitutional text.
As several commentators have recognized, fidelity to the constitu-
tional text can require adjustments in the application of textual prin-
ciples in light of changes in the social or legal context.89 Lawrence
86 Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 1 and U.S. CONST. art II, § 1 with U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
87 Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 451.
88 The "first best solution" would, of course, be to strike down the challenged institu-
tion or practice as unconstitutional and return to the constitutional baseline. The mini-
malist theory of precedent assures that second best solutions will be invoked only when
doing so is absolutely necessary.
89 See e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 85-106 (1994) (discussing theory of the unitary executive in light of
changed circumstances); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165
(1993).
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Lessig uses a musical metaphor to illustrate how alteration of context
may require changes in interpretation in order to maintain fidelity to
the text:
A concert pianist plays a series of outdoor concerts. On the third
night, the temperature falls dramatically, causing the piano to fall
"out of tune." Is it more faithful to Beethoven to leave the piano
out of tune? Would tuning the piano be the same kind of infidelity
as adding a couple of bars to the end of the first movement? Is
there no difference between tuning so the music sounds "the same"
(the same?) and changing the tempo or cutting some particularly
dark passages so the music sounds better?90
Likewise, the task of the Court is to make the Constitution "sound the
same" in the face of changes to the legal context.91 It is important,
however, not to add any new bars at the end or to confuse the song
that we would like to hear with the song that the Constitution intends.
In sum, by choosing to ignore the text in favor of precedent, the
Court departs from the constitutional baseline. In so doing, it gives a
person or a group of persons more political power at the expense of
another person or group of persons. The Court then has a duty to
create or allow the creation of institutions that help to realign the
power relations as close to the original baseline as possible.
The constitutionality of compensating institutions cannot, there-
fore, be examined in isolation. The Court should instead engage in a
comparative constitutional analysis. The total package of institu-
tions-triggering error plus compensating institution-should be
compared to the triggering error if allowed to stand alone. If the for-
mer is more consistent with constitutional baseline than the latter, the
compensating institution should be allowed. This is true even where
the compensating institution would, if examined in isolation, itself vio-
late the Constitution. The Constitution is not a particular set of iso-
lated provisions; it is a particular balance among institutions. If one
provision is misread, the balance is upset. If, for reasons of stare deci-
sis, that misreading cannot be undone, it makes sense to systematically
misread other provisions if doing so will restore the constitutional
balance. 92
90 Lessig, supra note 89, at 1170.
91 See, e.g., Olman v. Evans & Novak, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (discussing proper scope of First Amendment protection in light of changed
legal context).
92 Steve Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes have argued for what they call a "holistic"
method of interpreting structural provisions of the Constitution. Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 4, at 1157. They argue that the debate over the nature of the President's power
under Article II is relevant to, and should be considered in connection with, the debate
over Congress' power to control federal courtjurisdiction under Article III. Id. See also i&L
at 1157 n.7 (discussing various commentators who have pointed out the relationship be-
tween Article II and Article III). Their argument is fairly intuitive: The reading of one
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This Article will now tum to an examination of the legislative veto
as an example of a compensating institution. I will argue that its con-
stitutionality should be considered in conjunction with the delegation
of legislative power.
III
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: AN ACCEPTABLE SECOND BEST
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
LEGISLATIVE ABDICATION
The so-called legislative veto was conceived as an instrument for
securing congressional control over administrative agencies. At the
same time Congress delegated power to an agency, it would reserve to
itself the authority to "veto" the agency's exercise of that power in
specific instances. In many situations, a legislative veto required the
approval of only one House of Congress. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held the legislative veto unconstitutional in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha.93
This Part analyzes the legislative veto using the doctrine of modi-
fied formalism and the constitutional theory of the second best. It
concludes that the legislative veto is a legitimate second-best solution
to the triggering error of excessive delegation of legislative power to
administrative agencies. By evaluating the concrete example of
Chadha and the legislative veto in light of the constitutional theory of
the second best, I hope to clarify the theory and to demonstrate its
strength and utility.
A. Chadha
1. Background
Chadha involved an unusual application of the legislative veto.
Mr. Chadha was an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British pass-
port.94 He had entered the United States on student visa which ex-
pired in 1972,95 and failed to leave the country at that time.96
provision should affect the reading of provisions with similar language. My argument is
similar: The misreading of one provision should affect the reading of other provisions; or,
alternatively, the misreading of one provision in a particular context should affect the read-
ing of that provision in other contexts.
93 462 U.S. 919 (1982). As I discuss below, Chadha itself was actually a rather unusual
case. However, in subsequent cases, the Court summarily affirmed the view that the legisla-
tive veto was unconstitutional in the regulatory context. See Process Gas Consumer Group
v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affg 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1982); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affg 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
94 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
95 Id.
96 1&
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Accordingly, in 1973, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) initiated appropriate procedures to deport him for overstaying
his welcome.97 Chadha conceded that he was deportable but filed an
application for suspension of deportation pursuant to section
244(a) (1)" of the Immigration and Nationality Act.98 This provision
authorized the Attorney General to suspend deportation and to put
an alien on track to become a permanent resident of the United
States. 99
Under the statutory provisions then in effect, an alien in
Chadha's position would be eligible to remain in the U.S. and seek
permanent-resident status if he met three conditions: (1) He had to
have remained in the United States for a period of not less than seven
years; (2) he had to be of good moral character; and (3) deportation
would have had to result in a hardship to the alien or to a close rela-
tive who was either a citizen or legal resident of the United States. 00
The Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation was, in ac-
cordance with the statute, conveyed to Congress; if either the House of
Representatives orthe Senate passed a resolution disapproving the sus-
pension, the Attorney General would be required to deport the
alien. 101
In Chadha's case, the Immigration Judge (to whom the Attorney
General's authority was itself delegated) determined that Mr. Chadha
met all three statutory requirements. 0 2 Accordingly, the Immigration
Judge ordered the suspension of Chadha's deportation. 08 That deci-
sion was, as required by the statute, conveyed to Congress. 10 4 At the
last possible session in which Congress could have exercised its legisla-
tive veto in Chadha's case, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the
relevant congressional committee, introduced a resolution opposing
the decision to suspend the deportation of six aliens, including
Chadha. 10 5 This resolution was passed without debate or a recorded
vote, solely on the strength of Representative Eilberg's statement that
the Committee did not believe Chadha and the other five aliens had
met the statutory criteria.'0 6 Following the House veto of the order
suspending Chadha's deportation, the INS reopened Chadha's depor-
97 Id
98 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1988). See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919, 923.
99 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988).
100 Id. § 1254(a) (1).
101 Id. § 1254(c) (2); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 925.
102 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924.
103 Id
104 Id
105 Id at 926.
106 Id at 926-27.
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tation hearings.10 7 Chadha challenged the decision, and the case ulti-
mately found its way to the Supreme Court. 08
The Supreme Court found the legislative veto provision of sec-
tion 244(c) (2) unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger wrote the ma-
jority opinion, which commanded six votes; Justice Powell concurred
in the judgment, but on different grounds; 0 9 Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented." 0 In ruling as it did, the Court allowed Chadha
to remain in the United States and, at least by implication, found over
200 other statutory provisions unconstitutional.''
2. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Burger's opinion is a textbook application of the
formalist approach. The Court found that the legislative veto violated
both the "presentment" and "bicameralism" clauses" 2 of the Constitu-
tion.l" 3 Presentment and bicameralism are the familiar and, to the
formalist, mandatory mechanisms by which a bill becomes a law. The
bill must first be passed by a majority vote of both Houses of Con-
gress" 4 and then presented to the President." 5 The President may
sign the bill or veto it. If the President signs the bill, it becomes a law.
If the President vetoes the bill, it does not become a law unless both
107 I& at 928.
108 The Immigration Judge reopened the proceedings and ordered that Chadha be
deported. Id. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that
§ 244(c) (2) was unconstitutional. Id. The Board did not reach this issue, concluding that
it lacked the authority to hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional. 1d. Chadha then ap-
pealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the
INS conceded that § 244(c) (2) was unconstitutional. Id. The Ninth Circuit invited both
the House and Senate to file amicus briefs, which they did, arguing that the legislative veto
provision was constitutional. Id. The Ninth Circuit held the legislative veto provision un-
constitutional and ordered the INS to cease and desist from deporting Chadha. Id. De-
spite the fact that the INS had actually argued in the Court of Appeals that § 244(c) (2) was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the INS's
action left it "sufficiently aggrieved" to appeal the decision. Id at 930-31.
109 Id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 1013 (Rehnquist & White, J.J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 967 (White, J. dissenting).
112 Id. at 955-59.
113 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa-
tives.") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to
the President of the Unites States. .. .") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3
("Evey Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary... shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives. ..
(emphasis added).
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
115 Id. el. 2.
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Houses of Congress approve it by a two-thirds majority.116 To the for-
malist, this is the wayn-the only way-that a law may be enacted.11 7
Relying on these textual provisions, the Court concluded: "It is
beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both
Houses and the President."" 8 Each element of this shared grant of
power serves a specific purpose. "The President's role in the lawmak-
ing process... reflects the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever
propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, im-
provident, or ill-considered measures."" 9 Likewise, the bicameralism
provision serves to divide legislative power, making its abuse more dif-
ficult.' 2 0 All legislative action must meet these dual requirements.' 2 '
Thus, the Court reasoned that if the House's action with respect to
Chadha was properly characterized as "legislative in its character and
effect," then that action violated the presentment and bicameralism
provisions.' 22
According to the Court, Congress had "the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the
Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside
the Legislative Branch."12 3 The Court therefore found the legislative
veto was "legislative in its character and effect." Because the action by
Congress did not fall within any one of the "express constitutional
exceptions authorizing the House to act alone,"12 4 the Court accord-
ingly held the legislative veto unconstitutional.
116 Id. cl. 3.
117 See Lawson, supra note 7, at 900-01.
118 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947.
119 Id at 947-48 (citingTHE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)).
120 See id at 949-51 (discussing contemporaneous sources that emphasize the need to
divide legislative power between two Houses of a bicameral legislature).
121 See id at 951 ("It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in art. I.,
§§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Govern-
ment be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.").
122 Id. at 952. As the Court explained:
Not every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I. Whether actions taken by either
House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on
their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect."
Id. at 952, quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897) (other citation omitted).
123 Id. at 952.
124 Id. at 956. The Court noted four constitutional exceptions to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements, under which one House was given the power to act alone:
a. The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate im-
peachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
b. The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following im-
peachment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial.
Art. 1, § 3, cl. 6;
c. The Senate alone was given final, unreviewable power to approve or dis-
approve Presidential appointments: Art. II. § 2, cl. 2;
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3. The Powell Concurrence
Justice Powell concurred separately. Initially, he expressed reser-
vations about the scope of the Court's reasoning. Noting that the
Court's reasoning would entail striking down every single legislative
veto,Justice Powell stated that "[t] he breadth of this holding gives one
pause." 25 He therefore suggested a narrower, and, he argued, more
appropriate ground for decision. The majority had characterized the
action by Congress as legislative in character. Justice Powell dis-
agreed, arguing that Congress had unconstitutionally assumed ajudi-
cial role. 126
Justice Powell noted, as did the majority, that the Framers be-
lieved the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial power in
a single organ to be a grave threat to liberty.127 However, Justice Pow-
ell focused on different abuse, "prevalent during the Confederation,"
that the majority did not discuss: "the exercise of judicial power by
state legislatures." 128 Combining legislative and judicial power in one
department enabled that department "unilaterally to impose a sub-
stantial deprivation on one person."129 In order to prevent such
abuses on the national level, "the Framers vested the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial power in separate branches." 30 This separation was
accomplished by both the general provisions relating to separation of
powers and specific provisions such as the Bill of Attainder Clause.' 3 '
These provisions "reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a legisla-
ture lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power."' 32
Justice Powell concluded that Congress' action with respect to
Chadha was just such an abuse. He noted the course of proceedings:
d. The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negoti-
ated by the President. Art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955. Notably, none of these provisions allow truly unilateral action.
Items a and b should actually be read together, as removal from office requires both im-
peachment and trial. Similarly, the Senate's power to give its advice and consent to Presi-
dential appointments and to ratify treaties gives the Senate the power to review and check
Presidential action-not to initiate action on its own. In no case can either the Senate or
the House act unilaterally to exercise governmental power.
125 Id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
126 Id at 960 ("When Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statu-
tory criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in
violation of the principle of separation of powers.").
127 Id,
128 Id at 961.
129 Id at 962.
130 Id
131 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.").
132 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). If legislatures
are, as Justice Powell apparently concluded, institutionally incapable of providing a fair
trial, one wonders why the Framers gave the Senate the power to conduct trials in cases of
impeachment. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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Chadha's deportation was suspended; a report was sent to Congress;
and the House, without hearing or debate, decided that six of 340
persons should not have their deportation suspended. 133 The reason
given for the action by the House was that "the aliens did not meet
[the] statutory requirements." 13 4 Such congressional action was, Jus-
tice Powell believed, "clearly adjudicatory." 13 5 Instead of adopting a
general rule, the House "made its own determination that six specific
persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria."1 36 Moreover,
Justice Powell noted, Congress made this decision absent any "internal
constraints" or "procedural safeguards."13 7 Consequently, he con-
curred with the majority that the legislative veto, as to Mr. Chadha and
other similarly situated individuals, was unconstitutional. Unlike the
majority opinion, however, Justice Powell's concurring opinion had
no implications for the legislative veto as applied to agency
rulemaking.
4. Justice White's Dissent
Justice White dissented. 38 Like Justice Powell, Justice White be-
lieved that the Court should have decided the case on narrower
grounds.' 39 Justice White attributed the rise of the legislative veto to
the rapid growth of the administrative state during the New Deal.140
He explained that the legislative veto provided a mechanism "by
which Congress could confer additional authority [upon the Execu-
tive] while preserving its own constitutional role."14' The legislative
veto "is an important if not indispensable political invention that al-
lows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and
policy differences, assures the accountability of independent regula-
tory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over lawmaking."' 42
The legislative veto, therefore, served to "balance[ ] delegations of
133 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 96-69.
134 Id at 969.
135 Id
136 Id. at 968.
137 Id at 966.
138 Justice Rehnquist also dissented, but did notjoin White's dissent (justice White did
join Rehnquist's dissent). See id. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's
opinion is not discussed separately because the grounds for his dissent-that Chadha
lacked standing-are not relevant to this Article.
139 Id- at 967 (White, J. dissenting) (The Court "would have been well advised to de-
cide the cases, if possible, on the narrower grounds of separation of powers, leaving for full
consideration the constitutionality of other congressional review statutes operating on such
varied matters as war powers and agency rulemaking, some of which concern the in-
dependent regulatory agencies.").
140 Id at 968 ("The legislative veto developed initially in response to the problems of
reorganizing the sprawling Government structure created in response to the
Depression.").
141 Id. at 969.
142 Id. at 972-73.
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statutory authority in new areas of governmental involvement." 143
Thus, Justice White saw the legislative veto as crucial to the constitu-
tional legitimacy of the administrative state. 44
Justice White's dissent also noted the tension between the Court's
flexibility with respect to the nondelegation doctrine and its rigidity
with respect to the legislative veto. The notion that all exercises of
legislative authority require compliance with the presentment and bi-
cameralism requirements "ignores that legislative authority is rou-
tinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent
regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups."' 45 Thus,
consistent application of the majority's formalist approach would have
required the invalidation of the administrative state. The Court, how-
ever has not preferred a consistent application of formalist jurispru-
dence. Justice White criticized this inconsistency, saying that "[i]f
Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and Execu-
tive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting
Congress from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself."146
Justice White's dissent is therefore a textbook application of func-
tionalism. His defense of the legislative veto appealed directly to the
goals of separation of powers, rather than a strict understanding of
the separate roles of each department. He contended that the legis-
lative veto was not a threat to these goals because it has not historically
"been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself
at the expense of the other branches."147 Rather, the legislative veto
has served as "a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority
necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the
Nation's lawmaker."' 48 In true functionalist fashion, his opinion also
stressed the "history of accommodation and practicality"149 in the sep-
aration of powers doctrine, but failed to specify the mechanism by
which that history can be reconciled with the constitutional text and
structure.
Because the majority opinion and the White dissent start with
such different premises, the two opinions argue past each other. Had
143 Id. at 969-70.
144 Id. at 978 ("Only within the last half century has the complexity and size of the
Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the Congress must rely on the
legislative veto as the most effective if not the only means to insure its role as the Nation's
lawmaker.").
145 I. at 984.
146 Id at 986.
147 Id. at 974.
148 Id.
149 Id at 999. Justice White argued that the Court should invalidate governmental
action "only when the challenged action violate [s] some express provision in the Constitu-
tion." Id Apparently, Justice White does not consider the Vesting Clauses to be express
provisions of the Constitution.
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Justice White been armed with the theory of the second best, however,
he could have attacked the majority opinion on its own terms, by dem-
onstrating that textual fidelity actually requires that the legislative veto
be allowed, at least in certain limited circumstances. It is to such a
demonstration that I now turn.
B. Second Best Theory to the Rescue: Salvaging the
Legislative Veto
The constitutional theory of the second best offers a framework
within which the legislative veto can profitably be analyzed. If the leg-
islative veto had arisen absent broad delegations of legislative power to
administrative agencies, the Court would have been correct in con-
cluding that the legislative veto violates the presentment and bicamer-
alism provisions. As the Chadha majority demonstrated, the legislative
veto is not consistent with a formalist reading of the constitutional
text. Thus, standing alone, the legislative veto should not be allowed.
However, the legislative veto is an appropriate method of compensat-
ing for the prior, irreversible error of allowing the open-ended delega-
tion of legislative authority. In my parlance, the legislative veto serves
as a legitimate compensating institution for the triggering error of
open-ended delegation of legislative authority.150
150 Abner Greene has advanced a position that is similar to my own with respect to the
implications of open-ended delegation of lawmaking authority. Abner Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CH. L. REv. 123 (1994). Greene's argu-
ment is similar to that made here in that we both believe that "if we accept sweeping
delegations of lawmaking power to the President, then to capture accurately the framers'
principles... we must also accept some (though not all) congressional efforts at regulating
presidential lawmaking." Id. at 124. In forwarding this proposition, Professor Greene has
made a valuable contribution to the literature.
There are, however, at least two significant flaws in his analysis. First, although Greene
is correct in concluding that the nondelegation doctrine really is dead, see id. at 154-55, he
does not provide a theory of precedent to legitimate his claim. Modified formalism, by
contrast, incorporates a theory of precedent that provides a standard for concluding that
the original "instruction manual" has been superseded. Moreover, Greene appears, at
least in tone, too willing to accept modifications to the constitutional scheme that are not
absolutely necessary. For example, he suggests at one point that we should "take[ ] the
framers seriously, but metaphorically rather than literally." Id. at 129. I am not exactly
sure what this means. But, in any case, the prophylactic goals of separation of powers
require that the Constitution be taken literally, except when doing so is institutionally im-
possible. See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
Second, Greene's proposed solutions do not adequately restore the balance of power
between departments. Greene argues, for example, that Congress should be able to block
Presidential lawmaking by joint resolution. See Greene, supra, at 187. However, a one-
House veto more nearly restores the prior balance of power-bicameral approval. See infra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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1. Allowing the Open-Ended Delegation of Legislative Power Is a
Significant Constitutional Error
Congress cannot delegate legislative power. Article I, Section 1 of
the Constitution provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives."' 51 The text of this Vesting
Clause suggests that legislative powers are nondelegable: "All" legisla-
tive powers (not just some) are "vested" in Congress. Moreover, no-
where does the text accord Congress the express authority to give this
lawmaking power to anyone else. Nondelegation is further supported
by constitutional structures. Neither the presentment nor the bicam-
eralism provisions, nor, for that matter, the detailed provisions regard-
ing the makeup and mode of election of Congress, would make sense
if legislative power could be transferred to a body not so
encumbered. 152
Supreme Court precedent recognizes the principle of nondelega-
tion, although it is honored mostly in the breach. As the Court put it
in Field v. Clark, "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power...
is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and main-
tenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion."153 Despite "lenient" review of claimed violations of the
nondelegation doctrine, the Court has never explicitly repudiated the
nondelegation principle. 54 Even cases that allow extensive delega-
tions pay lip service to it.15 Nonetheless, the Court has applied the
nondelegation principle to strike down impermissible delegations in
only two cases, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan'56 and A.L.A. SchechterPoul-
try Corp. v. United States.157 These cases have been widely interpreted as
the Supreme Court's attempt to undermine the New Deal, and
neither has much vitality today.158
151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
152 The presentment and bicameralism provisions are discussed supra at notes 112-24
and accompanying text. Relevant provisions regarding the makeup of Congress include
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 & 2 (describing makeup of House of Representatives); art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3 (mode of election of House); art. I, § 3 cl. 1 & 3 (makeup of Senate); art. 1, § 3, cI.
1 & 2, and amend. XVII (mode of election of Senate).
153 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). See also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935) ("The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.").
154 David P. Currie, The Distribution bf Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 19, 29.
155 SeeMistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) ("[W]e have long insisted
that 'the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion' mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another
Branch.") (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. at 692).
156 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
157 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
158 See Stephan L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 719, 729.
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Regardless of any political motive the Court may have had in
these cases, however, both Panama Refining and Schechter represent a
relatively straightforward application of the nondelegation principle.
Both cases involved provisions of The National Industrial Recovery
Act, a broad-ranging statute enacted in response to the Depression.
The provision at issue in Panama Refining, allowed, but did not re-
quire, the President to prohibit the interstate transportation of oil
that exceeded the mandatory quotas of oil production allowed by par-
ticular states. 159 However, the President's discretion to enforce such
prohibitions was left effectively unfettered. 160 The Court was willing
to allow some leeway for interstitial executive rulemaking, conceding
that Congress could "lay[ ] down policies and establish[ ] standards,
while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate
rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which
the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply."' 61 However, the
Court found that "the Congress has declared no policy, has estab-
lished no standard, has laid down no rule."162 The executive, there-
fore, was not charged with the making of "subordinate rules" within a
policy set by Congress; rather, it was charged with making the policy
itself. Accordingly, the statute was held to constitute an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power.
In Schechter, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional another
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act. That provision al-
lowed the President to approve "codes of fair competition"-essen-
tially cartel agreements promulgated by industry groups and then
enforced by the government.163 The statute provided in general
terms that a code was to meet some general goals, but it did not spec-
ify the mechanism by which these general goals were to be
achieved. 64 Accordingly, as in Panama Refining, the Court found that
the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine:
[I]n that wide field of legislative possibilities, the proponents of a
code... may roam at will and the President may approve or disap-
prove their proposals as he may see fit. That is the precise effect of
the further finding that the President is to make-that the code
"will tend to effectuate the policy of this itle." While this is called a
finding, it is really but a statement of an opinion as to the general
159 Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 406.
160 Id. at 415 ("[The statutory provision] does not state whether, or in what circum-
stances or under what conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation of the
amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the State's
permission.").
161 Id. at 421.
162 Id at 430.
168 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-22.
164 Id. at 534.
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effect upon the promotion of trade or industry of a scheme of
laws. 165
In short, the statute at issue in Schechterwas unconstitutional because it
failed to constrain the President in any manner.
In the years following Schechter and Panama Refining, however, the
Court has not enforced the nondelegation doctrine scrupulously. In-
deed, one commentator has characterized the Court's attitude regard-
ing the nondelegation doctrine as being one of "complete
abandonment." 166 In order to see how thoroughly the Court has re-
versed its field on the nondelegation doctrine, one need only ex-
amine a case decided about fifty years after Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining. In Mistretta v. United States,167 the Supreme Court
demonstrated its willingness to approve a statutory scheme giving a
commission the power to "roam at will" through various possible sen-
tencing schemes and "approve or disapprove" such schemes "as [it]
may see fit." Indeed, it did so by an eight to one vote.
In Mistretta, the Court upheld the Sentencing Reform Act, which
created an agency-the United States Sentencing Commission (the
Sentencing Commission)-with the sole task of writing laws, and gave
that agency virtually free reign to write them as it saw fit. The sole
purpose of the Commission was to promulgate guidelines that would
limit the discretion of sentencingjudges.' 68 The Sentencing Commis-
sion could not exceed certain maximum penalties set forth in the stat-
ute.169 The Commission was to use current average sentences as a
"starting point"'70 from which to establish sentences, but it could
make the new sentences either more or less severe than before.' 71 In
addition, the statute listed four very general purposes that were to
guide the Commission's deliberations. 172 Finally, the Commission was
165 Id. at 538 (quoting the National Industrial Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933)
(repealed 1966)).
166 Lawson, supra note 10, at 1241.
167 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
168 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988) (establishing U.S. Sentencing Commission, "an in-
dependent commission in the judicial branch of the United States"). The statute also set
forth the terms of Commissioners, eligibility criteria for Commission membership, and
established conditions for removal of Commissioners. Id.
169 Id. § 994(b) (1).
170 Id. § 994(m).
171 Indeed, Congress apparently intended it do so. The statute provided that "[t]he
Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current
sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense." Id. The statute does
not, however, indicate in which cases the then-current sentences failed to reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense or the direction of this failure (whether current sentences are
thought to be too harsh, not harsh enough, or some of both).
172 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) (1988) lists four goals that sentencing is supposed to
accomplish:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
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instructed to consider seven factors in developing offense catego-
ries173 and eleven factors in developing categories of defendants. 174
In sum, the Commission was bound to use current sentences as a
"starting point" and to consider four purposes and eighteen different
factors in developing its guidelines.
The choices made by the commissioners were very similar to the
choices a legislature might make. Although Congress gave the Com-
mission some things to think about, these assorted considerations cer-
tainly did not operate to constrain it or set a policy for it to apply. The
only constraint on the Commission was mathematical: Within a par-
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner
The Sentencing Commission was to take these goals of sentencing into account in develop-
ing its guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). Furthermore, it had the task of discovering the
implications of each of these general goals on the sentencing scheme.
173 The seven factors to be considered, "among others," with respect to offense catego-
ries were:
(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which miti-
gate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including
whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a number of
persons, or a breach of public trust;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission
of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the Na-
tion as a whole.
Id. § 994(c). The Commission was to consider the extent to which these factors were rele-
vant and to "take them into account only to the extent that they do have relevance." Id
174 The 11 factors to be considered, "among others," in developing offender categories
were:
(1) age;
(2) education;
(3) vocational skills;
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition miti-
gates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is
otherwise plainly relevant;
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d). Again, the Commission was to determine whether these factors were
relevant, and to consider them "only to the extent that they do have relevance." Id
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ticular guideline range, the maximum term could exceed the mini-
mum by no more than "the greater of 25% or 6 months."' 75
The Court upheld this statute, finding that Congress had articu-
lated an "intelligible principle." 176 The words used in the Sentencing
Reform Act are certainly "intelligible," at least in the sense that they
appear to be standard English words arranged in complete sentences.
The statute is not gibberish. It is, however, difficult to ascertain any
controlling principle. So long as the Commission left a paper trail to
demonstrate that it "considered" the statutory purposes and factors,
virtually the only way that the Commission could have failed to meet
the statutory requirements would have been to refuse to issue any
guidelines at all. The standards to be applied by the Commission
were formulated so generally that virtually any result would have satis-
fied them. Thus, the Mistretta Court allowed the Sentencing Commis-
sion to exercise unconstrained policy judgment.
Although the Court has not expressly recognized the death of the
nondelegation doctrine, many other doctrines would be incompre-
hensible if the Court really applied it. For example, the rule laid
down by the Court in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.' 77 only makes sense if one assumes that legislative power is
being delegated. Chevron addressed the issue of whether the EPA's
organic statute permitted it to use the so-called "bubble" method in
dealing with certain environmental problems. 178 The Court held that
175 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2). An exception to this rule provided that the maximum
could be a life sentence where the minimum sentence within the range was 30 years or
more. Id.
176 488 U.S. at 372 (describing the test as whether Congress has articulated an "intelli-
gible principle"). The "intelligible principle" language originated inJ.W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1927), an early nondelegation case. There, the Court
ruled on a statute giving the President the duty to set tariff rates in order to "equalize" the
cost of production in the United States and foreign countries. Id. at 401. The Court deter-
mined that Congress' purpose was to "secure by law the imposition of customs duties on
articles of imported merchandise which should equal the difference between the cost of
producing in a foreign country... and the cost of producing and selling like or similar
articles in the United States." Id. at 404. The Court conceded that it might be difficult to
make the relevant factual determination, but it nonetheless believed that "the difference
which is sought in the statute is perfectly clear and perfectly intelligible." Id Accordingly,
J.W. Hampton did not involve a statute that was merely "intelligible" in a loose sense of the
term. Rather, the statute required the President to make an admittedly difficult factual de-
termination and then act on that factual determination in a prescribed manner. The ac-
tion that the President was required to take was "perfectly clear." Id. Thus, the statute did
not delegate policymaking authority to the President. Nor did the language of the case
purport to allow such a delegation, despite the Court's unfortunate use of the word
"intelligible."
177 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178 The EPA had allowed the states "to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within
the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single 'bubble.' " Id. at
840. The issue in the case was whether this policy was consistent with the statutory term
"stationary source." Id.
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the EPA's interpretation of its organic statute was entitled to defer-
ence.179 The purported constitutional underpinning for this rule, ac-
cording to the Court, was that such interpretations involved a policy
decision best not made by the judiciary i8 0 This analysis only makes
sense once one concedes that the agency is making policy judgments
akin to those that Congress makes. Were the agency really "bound" by
its statute-if, as the nondelegation doctrine supposedly requires, the
statute made the policy calls-then the Court would not be usurping a
political function by interpreting the statute de novo.
In a practical sense, then, the nondelegation doctrine is dead.
Agency regulations have the force of law and set general rules gov-
erning the conduct, rights, and obligations of citizens. 181 Justice
White's Chadha dissent was therefore quite accurate in its observation
that, despite the failure of the Supreme Court to renounce the
nondelegation doctrine outright, agencies make "law" all the time. 182
What Justice White failed to recognize, however, is that this state of
affairs is unconstitutional.
2. Open Ended Delegations of Legislative Power Are Here to Stay:
Applying the Minimalist Theory of Precedent
Under the formalist paradigm, open-ended delegations of legisla-
tive power are unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the minimalist theory
of precedent built into modified formalism requires an examination
of institutional reliance interests that have built up around a particu-
lar practice before that practice may be rejected as unconstitutional.
The administrative state is a paradigm case for application of the mini-
malist theory of precedent. Widespread institutional and cultural reli-
ance interests have formed around the ability of Congress to delegate
its power to executive and independent agencies. Were it not for the
collapse of the nondelegation doctrine, the federal government could
not conduct the wealth transfers and regulatory activity that have be-
come integral to economic and social expectations in our society.
Eliminating the rulemaking authority of agencies such as the SEC, the
FTC, the FCC, and others by resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine
would create chaos. Thus, the minimalist theory of precedent coun-
179 Id. at 843-44.
180 Id. at 866 ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
'Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.' ") (citation omit-
ted). For a thoughtful critique of the claimed constitutional underpinnings of Chevron, see
Cynthia R Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989).
181 See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (regulations have the force of
law).
182 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 986 (White, J., dissenting) ("There is no question but that
agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term.").
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sels against overruling the cases that form the foundations of the ad-
ministrative state.
Indeed, these changes have been so entrenched that they led
Bruce Ackerman to defend the constitutionality of the administrative
state on grounds very similar to intellectual adverse possession.
Although Professor Ackerman appears to be a fan of the administra-
tive state, he is intellectually honest and therefore willing to admit that
the administrative state raises troublesome constitutional issues. 183
Thus, in defense of the administrative state, he argues that the struc-
tural changes that have occurred since the New Deal (and the wide-
spread acquiescence to those changes) amount to a constitutional
amendment.184 However one conceptualizes the constitutional
change that took place in the late 1930s, Professor Ackerman is cer-
tainly correct in observing that all three departments have acquiesced
in this change over a significant period of time.185 For the Court
blithely to attempt to return to the original understanding of the Con-
stitution today would be politically impossible as well as imprudent. It
would undermine the institutional stability that courts and legal sys-
tems are supposed to enhance. Accordingly, like it or not, agencies
will have-and should be allowed to retain-effective lawmaking
authority.
3. The Legislative Veto Is a Legitimate Second-Best Solution to the
Problem of Excessive Delegation
Open-ended delegations are both unconstitutional and en-
trenched. Accordingly, while the Court should not overrule prior
cases allowing such delegations, it should consider them a triggering
error and allow Congress to create compensating institutions.
The legislative veto is one such compensating institution. As Jus-
tice White sensed, the legislative veto is a move closer to the proper
constitutional balance.' 86 The constitutional baseline requires trilat-
eral approval (or bilateral approval with a supermajority) of any
law.18 7 Delegation of legislative authority to the executive department
represents a move away from that baseline. As Justice White pointed
out, however, the legislative veto represents a move back toward that
baseline. Once the executive chooses to depart from the status quo,
the legislative veto allows a majority of either House of Congress to
block that departure. Thus, under a scheme combining delegation
183 See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Stom Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YAL L.J.
1013, 1053-54 (1984).
184 Id at 1055.
185 Id.
186 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 994-95 (White, J., dissenting).
187 See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text (discussing presentment, bicamera-
lism, and veto provisions).
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with a legislative veto, bicameral approval is still required; it is just that
most actions will be approved tacitly rather than explicitly.
At the very least, giving Congress the right to veto administrative
actions increases the number of distinct bodies that can disapprove of
a particular proposal before it becomes "law." Increasing the number
of people who must agree on a particular action has a certain liberty-
enhancing value. As Alexander Hamilton explained in defending the
propriety of giving the President veto power: "The oftener the mea-
sure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger
of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation . ... 188
Administrative action that is subject to a legislative veto will be ex-
posed to greater scrutiny, which may improve the quality of that ac-
tion or prevent ill-conceived action. Thus, the legislative veto is
consistent with the constitutional principle of protecting liberty by set-
ting the ambitions of various institutions against each other.
By contrast, the result of the Court's current nondelegationjuris-
prudence, together with the Chadha decision, is to concentrate in an
unelected administrative agency more power than is given to either
the House or the Senate. This result seems odd. Just as the danger of
unchecked authority led to the creation of a bicameral legislature and
a careful crafting of the executive power, that danger counsels in favor
of the imposition of checks on the power of administrative agencies.
The legislative veto provides one possible check. Like any human in-
stitution, the legislative veto works imperfectly; nonetheless, it pro-
vides at least some viable means of checking agency action.
4. What About the Text?
The legislative veto is a compensating institution intended to
counterbalance the triggering error of allowing excessive delegation.
But, under the formalist paradigm, the legislative veto is itself uncon-
stitutional. Thus, the legislative veto is not exactly a "compensating
institution," but rather a "compensating error." This Article argues
that, in this case, two wrongs may not quite make a right, but that two
wrongs are better than one alone.
A skeptic might ask how it could ever be justifiable for the Court
to ignore specific textual provisions. After all, the Court itself rejected
Justice White's functionalist argument partly on the ground that
neither convenience nor utility can suffice to uphold the legislative
veto.' 89 While it is true that the legislative veto is unconstitutional if
188 THE FEDERAuST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
189 See supra note 31 (discussing formalist unwillingness to take into account pragmatic
considerations in deciding separation of powers cases).
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measured against the formalist constitutional baseline, it is not at all
clear that formalism provides the right standard here.
The constitutionally relevant baseline is not the formalist Consti-
tution but is instead the modified formalist Constitution. The constitu-
tional analysis must, in other words, take into account changes in the
constitutional context. The legislative veto must be measured against
the actual alternative-a world of open-ended delegation-not
against a hypothetical ideal. The legislative veto, by countering the
error of excessive delegation, serves the separation of powers scheme
considered as a whole. Agencies are now allowed to promulgate regu-
lations under statutes that offer little or no constraint. "Laws" are
passed without approval of either House of Congress, and, in the case
of some agencies, even without the effective consent of the President.
Such a system itself violates the presentment and bicameralism provi-
sions of the Constitution. Under a system that includes the legislative
veto, "laws" are still implemented in violation of the presentment and
bicameralism provisions, but Congress retains a functionally similar
(although not identical) check that can operate to torpedo such laws.
Thus, a system of delegation of legislative power with the legislative
veto is a less serious violation of these provisions than a system of free-
standing delegation. The legislative veto is therefore more consistent
with constitutional principles than its real-world alternative. Accord-
ingly, it should be upheld.
Put somewhat differently, the legislative veto works, at least when
exercised, to block the implementation of regulations that were
promulgated in an unconstitutional manner. What could possibly be
wrong with that?
C. Applying the Theory of the Second Best to Chadha
The application of the theory of the second best to Chadha itself
is interesting. Chadha may not have involved the typical legislative
veto designed to curb excessive delegation of truly legislative author-
ity. The INS' decision to suspend Mr. Chadha's deportation could be
characterized as a legislative, executive, or judicial act. Whether the
theory of the second best can be invoked to save the particular legisla-
tive veto exercised in Chadha turns on that characterization.
If the decision with respect to Mr. Chadha was properly charac-
terized as inherently legislative, then the initial delegation to the At-
torney General was an unconstitutional delegation and, because it
would be irreversible, a triggering error. Thus, the Court would have
been wrong in striking that legislative veto because it would compen-
sate for a prior, ingrained error.
Alternatively, if the decision to suspend Chadha's deportation
could properly have been left to the executive department, then the
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Court was correct. If the delegation was constitutional in the first in-
stance, then the legislative veto would be unconstitutional. If there is
no triggering error, then there is nothing to compensate for, and,
therefore, no justification for the legislative veto.
Finally, it is possible that Chadha's claim was inherently within
the purview of the judicial department. If that is the case, then there
would be a triggering error since, under the formalist model, the
transfer of an inherently judicial task to the executive department is as
unconstitutional as the transfer of an inherently legislative power to
the Executive. 190 Nonetheless, the legislative veto would not serve as a
compensating institution. Giving the legislature a say in the decision
to allow Mr. Chadha to remain in the United States would not result
in a move toward the constitutional baseline if the decision in Chadha
was inherently judicial in nature. Indeed, for all of the reasons dis-
cussed injustice Powell's concurrence, 191 legislative involvement in an
inherently judicial function would probably be worse than its involve-
ment in a purely executive decision.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of the legislative veto that
would have resulted in Chadha's deportation depends on how that
veto is characterized. Only where the Constitution has already been
flouted in a particular manner-where there has been an unconstitu-
tional delegation of inherently legislative power-is the legislative veto
a legitimate option.
CONCLUSION
Administrative governance has two fundamental characteristics:
delegation and combination. Legislative and adjudicative tasks are
delegated to an independent or executive agency, where those tasks
are combined. I have applied the theory of the second best to one
particular triggering error-delegation of legislative authority-and
suggested one particular compensating institution-the legislative
veto. But the theory of the second best can have broader application
than the legislative veto. Let me offer a few tentative thoughts on fur-
ther applications of this theory, with the caveat that I have not sub-
jected these thoughts to the necessary rigorous analysis.
Perhaps the theory of the second best might require the judiciary
to take a more-gasp-activist role in forging compensating institu-
tions. For example, an alternative second best solution to the trigger-
ing error of legislative delegation would be to require that more
190 See Lawson, supra note 7, at 879 (arguing that, under the formalist model, all exer-
cises of "the judicial power" must be by Article IlIjudges). For whatever reason, however,
the Supreme Court has not agreed with Professor Lawson. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 888-90
(non-Article III courts may exercise the judicial power).
191 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).
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rulemaking take place in formal, on-the-record proceedings. Perhaps
requiring that the agency meet procedural requirements could substi-
tute for presentment and bicameralism. 192
Nor is the delegation of legislative power the only possible trig-
gering error. Just as the administrative state involves the unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power, so too does it involve the
unconstitutional delegation ofjudicial power. 193 Such delegations are
as central to the administrative state as delegations of legislative
power. Furthermore, the courts currently review factual determina-
tions by administrative agencies under a very deferential standard.194
Nobody today challenges this practice, but it nonetheless raises a seri-
ous Article III problem. Perhaps additional procedural safeguards, or
a harsher standard of review, would be appropriate.
Even more importantly, the administrative state involves the com-
bination of these improperly delegated powers with each other and
with the exercise of proper executive powers. 195 One of the most
troubling combinations is the combination of prosecutorial and adju-
dicative functions. Perhaps a judicially imposed doctrine of separa-
tion of functions within agencies would serve to ameliorate this
difficulty. In particular, the Court might consider requiring that, as in
the NLRB, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions be kept separate,
or that Administrative Law Judges be given protections akin to salary
and tenure protections. 96
Administrative bodies exercise governmental authority outside of
the constitutional mechanisms designed to regulate that exercise of
power. That is not going to change any time soon. With the excep-
tion of a few curmudgeons, most people seem reasonably satisfied
with the system. At least politically, the abolition of administrative
192 This would call into question a number of Supreme Court cases, including, most
notably, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that an agency was not required to provide procedural pro-
tections greater than those set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (although it was
free to do so if it wished)).
193 See supra note 190 (discussing requirement that only Article IIIjudges exercise "the
judicial power").
194 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951) (holding that find-
ings of fact by administrative agencies in formal proceedings will be upheld if supported by
"substantial evidence").
195 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 1248 ("The destruction of this principle of separation
of powers is perhaps the crowningjewel of the modem administrative revolution. Admin-
istrative agencies routinely combine all three governmental functions in the same body,
and even in the same people within that body.").
196 Some have argued that due process values require adjudicative independence. See
Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Proce-
dural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 499 (1986) (discussing independence of Administrative
Law Judges). While I might reach some of the same conclusions on this issue as would
Professors Redish and Marshall, I would reach those conclusions by a separation of powers
path rather than a due process path.
1994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
agencies and a return to the formalist system of constitutional govern-
ance has become unthinkable.
This unwillingness to challenge the underpinnings of the admin-
istrative state accounts for the Supreme Court's unwillingness to face
up to the challenges raised by its growth. If the Court were to address
these problems honestly, the Court might be forced to face the pros-
pect of refighting the battle that it lost over the New Deal. I would
agree that the Court could not win, and should not attempt such a
battle. It is better, however, for the Court to concede that our current
government is, in many respects, inconsistent with the structural Con-
stitution. If the Court were to adopt a minimalist theory of precedent
in combination with a constitutional theory of the second best, such a
concession would not require the Court to attempt unilaterally to
abolish the New Deal. By adopting this approach, however, the Court
could address the issues raised by the "Fourth Branch" in an honest
and straightforward manner. Even people who wholeheartedly ap-
prove of the administrative state should be at least a little troubled by
the degree to which it compromises constitutional values. At the very
least, we should try to limit the damage to these values as much as
possible.
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